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Private Equity: What Happens Next? 
 
Miguel Machete Botelho 
Abstract: 
Previous academic research has focused on Private Equity funds’ superior performance, when 
compared to respective benchmarks. However, there is still a question to be answered: what 
happens after these funds’ targets leave Private Equity’s protective wing? From a sample of 
426 observations, from which 180 had previously been funded by Private Equity, in both US 
stock exchanges, we built a first-differences regression model to investigate the subject. We 
found evidence showing that Private Equity’s superiority during funds’ lifetime is paid away in 
the years after. Our sample revealed a negative effect detected on long-term performance of 
firms whose Initial Public Offerings were Private Equity-backed. The data collected suggests a 
possible variation of the negative impact, depending on the industrial sector. There is also 
evidence that smaller firms are more affected than larger firms, by the identified Private Equity 
effect. The percentage of outstanding shares issued at IPO is positively correlated with the 
negative impact under scrutiny, when less than half of the total equity had been issued. 
Nevertheless, one must be cautious when interpreting the results, as our performance measures 
are scaled by the market capitalization, which is subject to investors’ overvaluation. 
 








Private Equity: O Que Se Segue? 
 
Miguel Machete Botelho 
Sumário: 
A literatura académica tem vindo a concentrar-se na rentabilidade superior dos fundos de 
Private Equity, quando comparados com os respectivos benchmarks. No entanto, uma questão 
permanece por responder: o que acontece às empresas previamente detidas por estes fundos 
depois de deixarem de o ser? De uma amostra de 426 observações, das quais 180 foram 
previamente financiadas por Private Equity, em ambas as bolsas de valores dos EUA, 
construímos um modelo de regressão de primeiras diferenças para investigar o assunto. 
Encontrámos provas de que a rentabilidade superior verificada em Private Equity, durante a 
vida dos fundos, tem um reverso nos anos seguintes. A nossa amostra revelou um efeito 
negativo detectado no desempenho de longo prazo das empresas submetidas a Ofertas Públicas 
de Aquisição por fundos de Private Equity. Os dados recolhidos sugerem uma possível variação 
desse efeito, dependendo do sector industrial a que cada empresa pertence. Há também 
evidências de que empresas de menor dimensão de activos são mais as afectadas pelo efeito 
negativo de Private Equity. A percentagem de ações em circulação emitida em OPA está 
positivamente correlacionada com o efeito negativo identificado, o que, consequentemente, nos 
levou a resultados, estatisticamente verificados, de que este se encontra presente apenas perante 
percentagens inferiores a cinquenta porcento. Contudo, é preciso ter em conta que, na 
interpretação destes resultados, as medidas de desempenho utilizadas foram ajustadas pela 
capitalização de mercado, sujeita à sobrevalorização por parte dos investidores. 
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Private Equity (PE) funds invest in firms in need of capital to either recover from financial 
difficulties or to fuel growth. They acquire these targets with the purpose of selling them, on 
average, four to seven years later. During this period the funds’ managers often play the role of 
activist shareholders, in order to fulfil their agenda within the intended timeline. 
Previous academic research has found that the way PE manages its investments in companies 
throughout the funds' lifetime, has led to an-above average performance when benchmarked 
against companies that didn’t receive PE investments. But this leads us to one of the basics in 
economics: there are no free lunches. Or are there? What happens to these firms after leaving 
the funds' protective wing?  There are many different opinions regarding the subject. Critics 
argue that excessive levels of debt contracted and a focus on quick returns, during funds' 
lifetime, destroy value in the long run. Supporters defend that specialized financing agents, 
enable value growth without damaging future performance. Who is right? Do PE fund managers 
compromise the future long-term performance of their investments to maximize their exit price, 
or is it indeed, a free lunch? 
This study intends to fill in the gap identified in academic research, by investigating the impact 
in the post-exit value of a company, caused by PE management techniques. We are going to 
compare the value of companies immediately after leaving the portfolio of PE funds with that 
of three years later, in order to study whether performance is, in fact, different between PE-
backed and non-PE-backed IPOs. 
The performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), as an exit strategy, will be the event taken 
under scrutiny. We will approach performance analysis through this path as it leads to 
comparing the strategy implemented by PE funds’ targets with the one applied by other firms 
in the same situation. An IPO is the third most common exit strategy applied by PE funds 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Adding this idea to the fact that the new owners of the exited 
companies are the same for every observation (the market), we decided to study performance 
on firms going under the same conditions, hence the same exit strategy: the IPO. 
When comparing all the IPOs issued worldwide, the United States is by far the most prolific 
market in terms of the number of deals that happen every year (PwC). We identified it as an 
opportunity for our investigation, since it provided a large number of observations, and 




From a sample of 426 observations, 180 of which were PE-backed, taken from the 2 largest  
stock exchanges in the United States – NYSE and NASDAQ – we analysed what differed 
between treatment (PE-backed) and control (non-PE-backed) groups, in terms of their long-
term performance, defined by the three years following the date of admission to the stock 
exchange. These observations were collected, considering all the firms listed in these two 
markets, from the year 2010 to 2014. Two samples were collected for each observation, one at 
the end of the IPO year and a second instance three years later.  
The test where this thesis is centred focuses on the null hypothesis: “Private Equity’s influence 
on targets still remains after the exit strategy”. The alternative hypothesis to our investigation 
is “Private Equity’s impact after the exit strategy can be neglected”.  
Our main finding was a long-term, negative, impact on return on equity, created on companies 
previously financed through PE. Later, we dived deeper into this effect and identified where 
this financing mechanism had its strongest influence. In fact, the intrinsic characteristics of 
observed companies, such as the business sector in which they operate, their size, and 
proportion of shares admitted for listing in an IPO, in relation to the amounts of shares 
outstanding, all affect our initial conclusions. 
The remainder of our study is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the status quo in 
academic literature, explaining why PE-backed firms perform better during the funds’ lifetime. 
This section bridges with current knowledge to a focus on what is documented about the 
consequences for the long-term performance of companies. In Section 3, we present the steps 
we took to construct our dataset and explain how we designed the regression model to study 
operating performance in the long-run. Section 4 details the results obtained during this research 
and provides a possible explanation for the outputs of the model, whilst laying out any potential 





2. Literature Review: 
Ever since its conception, in the 1980s, there has not been a homogeneous opinion about PE 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Supporters defend it creates economic value on its targets and 
improves their operations’ efficiency. Critics state PE takes advantage of market timings and 
provide their targets with incentives on short-term performance, through reductions in capital 
expenditures and staff, harming the prospects for long-term projects. 
PE’s two major types are VC and Leveraged Buyout (LBO) funds (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). 
The first kind consists mainly of targeting minority ownership positions in young firms in need 
of capital to expand their operations, helping them growing their activities and entering new 
markets. LBO’s targets are usually majority control of more mature and undervalued firms. The 
strategy for both cases is to buy at low cost and sell the targets, four to seven years later, on 
average, a much higher value than the initial deal. 
For many years, researchers have studied performance on PE funds. Harris et al. (2014) found 
out that these funds generally beat the market index (S&P 500) from the 1980s to 2000s, an 
outperformance of at least 3% a year.  
Diving deeper into this theme, it has been studied the factors that help us understanding it. When 
analysing PE funds, authors focused on the people behind them. Studying whether the 
performance was depending on the funds’ management led some authors to a different 
conclusion from investors’ usual expectation. The studies revealed that different funds have 
different performances, not being significantly influenced by their managing partners, in the 
post-2000s PE funds (Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan, & Stucke, 2014). Brown et al. (2017) 
confronted these conclusions, when they acknowledged performance consistencies from one 
fund to another, hypothesising decreases in performance as being either due to loss of talent 
(managers leaving for other firms) or increased market competition. 
Even though the findings by Harris et al. (2014), referred above, are surprising, Kaplan & 
Schoar (2003) identified evidence, stating that successful fund managers tend to carry on their 
activities by creating larger funds. According to Metrick & Yasuda (2010), LBO is regarded as 
more scalable than VC, since it uses more capital to invest in larger firms, relying on the idea 
that what they apply to smaller investments may succeed in larger ones. For VC, as these funds 
invest in much smaller firms, more money leads to investing in more firms, which may lead to 




We find challenging the fact of larger PE funds being able to perform better. These events go 
against what has been observed by Moeller et al. (2004; Cao & Lerner, 2009), who found out 
that larger firms tend to perform more poorly in mergers and acquisitions when compared to 
smaller firms. The authors concluded that acquisitions made by large firms tend to result in 
large dollar losses, whereas the ones made by smaller firms tend to result in small dollar gains. 
PE funds’ main source of income is capital gains, which leads us to question what these funds 
do to obtain such results. 
As mentioned earlier, PE funds focus their investment strategies on buying to sell, after firms’ 
structural interventions. The usual time horizon of investments lies between four and seven 
years. After this period, an exit strategy is put in motion, by selling the invested firm, making 
returns on capital gains. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) identified selling to strategic acquirers, 
selling to a secondary LBO fund and IPOs as the exit strategies most commonly used by PE 
between 1980 and 2007. 
Directing to the reasons why we find the targets of PE funds better performing than the others, 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) define the intervention as changing the structure on three fields: 
financial, governance and operational. 
Regarding the first one, financial restructuring transformations aim mainly to change 
management’s incentives and leverage. PE-backed firms management are given a large equity 
upside, biasing the decisions into creating higher enterprise value in the short-term. They also 
present higher debt-to-equity ratios than the average, which discourages wasting money on 
unnecessary projects that would hinder the payments of interests and principal. 
Concerning the second field, governance, alterations are predominantly on the Board size and 
meetings periodicity, together with management turnover. When assuming their targets’ 
ownership, PE funds decrease the size of the Board and increase the number of meetings per 
year. These measures improve monitoring on the activities and decrease information 
asymmetry. Moreover, the poorly performing management under their control is replaced, 
focusing on maximizing the value of the firm. 
In the operational field, the changes are achieved through the introduction of industry expertise, 
hiring professionals and making use of external/internal consulting groups. In this area, PE 
funds tend to intervene in order to make firms more efficient, thus maximizing their value. 
According to supporters of PE, these different types of structuring engineering are responsible 




& Kaplan, 2014). Nonetheless, as described before, there is no unanimous opinion on what 
concerns PE’s strategies. In fact, evidence found by Sincerre, Sampaio, Famá, and Flores 
(2019), in the Brazilian market, identified that, even the new management of firms previously 
financed by PE, and non-PE-backed, had different approaches still, after the IPO. The purpose 
of this thesis is to follow the critics’ viewpoint and to test whether or not their concerns are 
legitimate. 
From the conclusions drawn by Lee and Wahal (2004), we may infer that investors trust more 
on firms previously financed by PE to perform better in the market. The authors conclude that 
the more recognised a firm is before going public, the higher the costs from underpricing. 
According to Chan et al. (2004), stock performance does not depend purely on investors’ 
expectations, but also on operating performance, as there was found a positive correlation with 
this second factor. Following this line of thought, we will study if investors’ expectations are 






In this Section, we will describe the construction of our dataset and how we achieved the 
regression model used for the analysis 
3.1. Data: 
Collecting and transforming the data to elaborate on this thesis was not an easy process. It was 
necessary to go through various steps before achieving the final sample. 
3.1.1. Collecting market observations: 
When analysing the IPOs worldwide, the United States stood out from other markets by the 
number of deals made each year. This emerged as an opportunity for this study, as more 
observations allow a better understanding of the real effects occurring.  
The data studied in this dissertation is composed of IPOs taking place between 2010 and 2014 
in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ. Assembly was made through the 
information available in Thompson Reuters Eikon and Wharton Research Data Services.  The 
period of study was selected with the objective of collecting the most recent events, ensuring 
the firms carried on their public status after the three years of analysis. 
To obtain a table with all the required information, for the purpose of this study, the first step 
was to collect all observations in the defined period, by researching the events available on 
Thomson Reuters Eikon, counting a total of 1130 firms. Not all the events were adequate for 
analysis, so several criteria were applied to select the firms suitable for our research.  
The first criterion was geographical. Performance may be biased by the country where firms 
are ensconced, so we narrowed our range to the United States market. As the analysis is focused 
on American stock exchanges, we intended to use a sample as large as possible, thus focusing 
on the country involving most firms.   
The second measure was related to the type of IPO issued. Some events registered by Thomson 
Reuters Eikon were funds being issued, which cannot be used for our analysis. We want to 
study operating performance measures, and funds group various firms, which would create 
noise in our conclusions. Moreover, many indicators used in our regression are not available 
for funds and others would create too much noise in our conclusions. Hence, we decided to 
exclude these from the analysis. 
The third test performed was to verify whether or not the firm had stayed in the public stock 




performance, by observing two distinct periods, the IPO year and three years afterwards. When 
the firm could not be observed in the stock market three years later, after the IPO, it was 
removed from the sample.  
The fourth gauge applied was to take out of the sample all observations that were intervened by 
PE funds during the period being studied. Since our study is focusing on the impact of PE after 
leaving the firms’ ownership, these observations would be biasing our conclusions, therefore 
were excluded. Our objective was to evaluate whether the culture implemented by PE on their 
targets still has its influence after the funds’ maturity. Having this in mind, we could not include 
in our observations cases where the firm was still under PE possession during the period studied. 
The final filter applied on our dataset was performed by checking if all the information required 
was available in both databases, Thomson Reuters Eikon and Wharton Research Data Services. 
When it was not possible to access the information, we decided to remove the observation from 
the sample. 
Once carried out these examinations, the final sample had 426 observations. From these events, 
180 were PE-backed IPOs, accounting for a total of 42% of the studied occurrences. 
3.1.2. Creating a panel dataset: 
A panel dataset construction involves identifying two (or more) observations in time for the 
same individual. To construct such a sample, one needs to observe different individuals in 
various moments in time. Our sample was constructed in a way that each firm was observed 
two times: the first period, t-1, was the IPO year-end; the second period, t, was the third year-
end after the IPO. 
Every variable, described in 3.2, has been collected for each moment required to define both 
extremes of the time-frame under investigation. Later, a new variable, Post, was added to the 
sample, taking either the value of 0 or 1, depending on whether the observation was collected 
at the end of the IPO year or three years later. 






Table 1: Variables’ description 
The following table defines the different variables that compose our dataset by the symbol applied in 
regressions. Description contains a brief explanation of what information each variable involves. 
Symbol Description 
Ticker Unique identifier of each firm 
Year Year when IPO was issued 
PE Defining whether the firm had contact with PE before the IPO or not 
IN2DROE Average ROE of the two-digit SIC code defined industry level 
IN2DROA Average ROA of the two-digit SIC code defined industry level 
LA Logarithmic function of assets market value proxy 
DE The Leverage ratio, debt to equity, in market values 
Post Defining whether the observation was collected at the end of the IPO year or three years later 
ROE Ratio defined by net income divided by equity market value at the end of the fiscal year 
ROA Ratio defined by operating income divided by assets market value at the end of the fiscal year 
 
Figure 1: Total number of IPOs per year 
The figure below presents the total number of deals collected in our sample, differentiating PE’s targets 
and other firms. In the x labels, we may find the five years under investigation. In the y labels, we find 
the number of deals occurred. 
 
Figure 2: Total market capitalization by year of IPO 
The figure below presents the total amount collected when issued the IPO, differentiating PE’s targets 
and other firms. In the x labels, we may find the five years under investigation. In the y labels, we find 
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Figure 3: Representation of each sector in the sample 
The figure below presents the weight each industrial sector has within our sample. In the x labels, we 
may find the sector name. In the y labels, we find the percentage of our whole sample, in terms of IPOs, 
represented by each sector.  
 
3.2. Study variable and performance measures: 
During this investigation, we used a dummy variable to analyse the effect of PE on 
performance. PE was constructed through observing the historical relationship of each 
individual observation with PE Funds, using Thomson Reuters Eikon. The dummy variable 
allows us to make the distinction between treatment and control groups. The latter consists of 
all observations non-PE-backed. The former are the firms affected by PE, that may still be 
influenced by these funds even after their leaving.  
If, before the IPO date, the observation had been in possession of a fund, the variable would 
take the value 1, otherwise it would take the value 0. There are some limitations regarding this 
method, as it does not differentiate the various types of exiting PE, which could lead to different 
results. We will study the PE’s effect as a whole, disregarding the types of funds that backed 
the issuance. 
Afterwards, we made an interaction with the variable Post. The result, PE_Post, was a variable 
that took the value 1 if the observation had been extracted three years after the IPO of a firm 









To understand the effect of PE funds in the long-term performance of the firms they invest in, 
we decided to analyse Returns on Equity (ROE) and Returns on Assets (ROA).  
As a matter of fact, ROE is commonly known as a measure of management’s effectiveness in 
the company’s usage of assets to create profits. It will be the first dependent variable. PE 
influences management’s culture and the operational performance of firms, which leads to 
heterogeneous opinions on whether it is beneficial or not (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Through 
the observation of the PE on this variable we intend to provide with some insights that may help 
investors making their own opinion regarding this subject. ROE is calculated through the Net 
Income at the end of the fiscal period divided by the market capitalization within the same time 
range. 
ROA is a good proxy to measuring firms’ efficiency of assets, thus it was used as our second 
dependent variable. This measure scales the management competence in order to use the assets 
efficiently. It weights PE influence on making the most of the productive assets in the long-
term. ROA, however, has its limitations, namely scaling an operating variable (operating 
income) by another value, involving also non-operating assets (Barber & Lyon, 1996). In order 
to make this indicator as useful as possible for interpretation, the value of assets used has been 
submitted to two different corrections. The first approximation was intended to achieve the 
market value of assets. As our sample only included observable book values, we decided to 
correct these, by adding the book value of shareholders’ equity and deducting its market 
capitalization. The second step was to remove one item, common to every observation, that 
does not create added value, concerning the firms’ operations: cash. By the end of these two 
correction stages, we achieved an approximation of cash-adjusted assets’ market value. Later, 
we divided the operating income by this amount, reaching our second dependent variable for 
this thesis: ROA. Even though we made these values more suitable for analysis, we still need to 
be cautious to their limitations, like being constantly undervaluing the efficiency of the assets, 
as we are keeping in our denominator some non-operating assets (Barber & Lyon, 1996). In 
spite of this situation, we can be confident in our comparative analysis, as the whole sample is 
submitted to the same approximations, thus our results are going to be comparable across 
different observations. 
3.3. Control Variables: 
The control variables to be applied are effects that may vary during the period under 




value of assets, the leverage ratio and the year when the IPO occurred helped us understanding 
better the effect of PE during the three years that follow the entrance in the stock market. 
According to Barber and Lyon (1996), samples must be controlled for different industries. This 
process was achieved by computing the industry two-digit SIC average value of the different 
dependent variables, in market values, at the end of IPO year and three years after. The market 
average was extracted from Wharton Research Data Services. The variables allowed us to 
control for industry abnormal performance, during the period of study of each observation.  
To mark changes on company’s value within the time-frame under scrutiny, we opted to include 
in our model a variable that marked abnormal growth of assets throughout different 
observations. The variable used in this situation was a proxy of the market value of assets, 
similar to the denominator of our dependent variable ROA, but including also the amount of 
cash, as we believe changes in the whole size of the firms must be accounted for. Later, a 
logarithmic transformation was applied to the component in order to obtain a distribution close 
to the normal density function, resulting in the variable LA. 
Leverage influences both, the management culture and the earnings of firms. In fact, having 
higher values of debt, results into more disciplined management of the firm's resources. This 
component also has an influence on net income through interest tax shields. One other 
consequence of changes in leverage is the risk of financial distress. In fact, the higher values 
for the ratio result in the business being perceived as more risky, by the investors. The variable 
DE was created by dividing the net assets (a proxy of the market value of assets subtracted the 
market value of equity) by the market value of equity. 
The last characteristic we wanted to control for was the timing of the IPO. As the market is not 
constant, occurring growth and recession economic cycles, we must consider these effects in 
our model. Following this line of thought, we created a cluster variable, Year, that marks the 
point in time when the data was extracted (both the IPO year and the period Post IPO, three 
years later). 
Some of the variables described present outliers, which would bias our conclusions on 
modelling on the mean. To correct these observations, we applied the same procedure as used 
by Barber and Lyon (1996), winsorizing all information at the first and 99th percentiles. The 





3.4. First differences: 
Throughout the period under analysis, some characteristics specific to each firm are not 
observed, such as life-cycle and the amount offered at IPO. Although this hurdle is present in 
our data, it can be mitigated through the use of panel data. The model applied in this thesis 
includes two periods, the year when the IPO was issued and three years later, computing the 
influence of treatment (having been PE-backed) throughout this range.  
Academia has investigated several methodologies to evaluate the behaviour of the treated 
population during events. From the various regressions used in the past, those that provided 
more accurate results were the ones comparing one period to the state the observation found 
itself in a period before. Panel data analysis is set to evaluate the difference between the changes 
in the value under scrutiny, between the period of the event, t, and the one prior to it, t-1, or 
Δ𝑦 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−1. Dependent variables’ distributions are graphically represented in Figure 4. 
Moreover, comparing differences between the performance of treated and control groups results 
in more powerful statistics, as Barber and Lyon (1996) found evidence upholding this 
conclusion. 
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the average effect of PE on post-IPO performance. To 
better understand it, the model chosen is an improvement from a mere temporal comparison as 
it acknowledges that possible improvements might be due to some factors external to the firm. 
Regarding the controlled components explained before, a focus on the change in performance 
is more meaningful. Thus, the model is going to analyse the difference in the dependent 
variable, Δ𝑦𝑖, created by PE-backed IPO, 𝑃𝐸_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖, where i is the firm observed.  
All in all, the regression understudy is specified as follows: 
𝛥𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖                                                (1) 
where i is the firm index. In this regression we consider the only difference during the period 
as the treatment, in this situation, being previously PE financed. However, as stated before, we 
identified more characteristics that do not remain constant: the industry-specific effects, the 
leverage ratio and the market value of assets. The year of IPO, even though it doesn’t change 
through time, has also some influence in performance, thus it must be controlled. The final 
model can be defined in equation (2). Coefficients are described in Table 2. 




Figure 4: Boxplot representing the distributions in both dependent variables’ differences 
The figure below presents boxplots for the distribution of the difference within each dependent variable, 
ROE and ROA, in our sample, between the third year-end after the IPO and the IPO year. ROE is 
calculated by dividing the net income by the market capitalization, at the end of the fiscal year. ROA is 
calculated by dividing the operating income by the market value approximation of cash-adjusted assets, 
at the end of the fiscal year. Cash-adjusted assets is computed by adding the market capitalization to the 
book value of assets, deducting the book value of equity and the cash and cash equivalents amount. In 
the y labels, we may find the values observed for the differences calculated during the period. 
 
 
Table 2: Coefficients’ description 
The following table presents each of the coefficients involved in our regression. The second column 
presents the symbols of the variables associated with each coefficient and the third column briefly 
describes the interpretation of the effects caused by the coefficients. 
Coefficient Variable Interpretation 
- Δ𝑦 Change in the dependent variable (ROE, ROA) 
𝛽1 𝑃𝐸_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 The average impact on long-term performance created by Private-Equity 
𝛽2 Δ𝐼𝑁2𝐷(𝑦) The average industry-specific abnormal performance on dependent variable y 
𝛽3 Δ𝐷𝐸 The average change in the capital structure 
𝛽4 Δ𝐿𝐴 The average change in the market value of assets 





4.1. Overview of all regression models: 
In this Section we will present the results obtained through the panel linear regression models 
performed, that compare PE-backed IPOs with non-PE-backed through the variable PE_Post.  
Both dependent variables, described in Table 3, measure performance in different perspectives, 
therefore conclusions might be drawn from a wider picture on PE influence after leaving firms’ 
ownership. We also present comparisons between treatment and control groups in both periods. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarises the data obtained dividing all the observations into four different sub-groups, two 
for each period. The periods, defined by the variable Post (the variable takes value 0 if the firm is 
observed at the end of the IPO year, and 1 if in the following period, 3 years later). The variable PE 
defines whether the IPO was PE-backed or not. The p-value column represents the statistical result to 
the two-sided t-test at the difference in means between PE-backed IPOs and the others, having zero as 
an alternative hypothesis. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
   PE = 0  PE = 1   
   N Average  N Average  p – value 
Post = 0         
 ROE  246 0.028  180 -0.004  0.060* 
 ROA  246 0.008  180 -0.016  0.012** 
Post = 1         
 ROE  246 0.030  180 -0.120  0.000*** 
 ROA  246 0.011  180 -0.072  0.000*** 
From data on Table 3, we start to suspect of the existence of a PE effect on our operating 
indicators. Although, this is not accurate to assume, since a constant difference over time would 
still show the same results, when testing the difference in means. The table only allows the 
reader to conclude PE-backed IPOs start trading in the stock market from an inferior position 
when compared to others, but we still need more information to draw conclusions.  
The model defined in equation (2) helps us to understand the differences in changes on the 
dependent variables, ROE and ROA, avoiding firm-specific biases. We wanted our investigation 
to go deeper than just comparing the state right after the IPO. We aim to understand if PE still 
influences after the funds’ maturity, hence we are going to approach an analysis of change 
during the three years performance after the IPO. Our model’s results are presented in Table 4, 





Table 4: Model overview 
This table presents the impact of PE-backed IPOs, in comparison to others, on performance measured 
by ROE and ROA. ROE is calculated by dividing the net income by the market capitalization, at the end 
of the fiscal year. ROA is calculated by dividing the operating income by the market value approximation 
of cash-adjusted assets, at the end of the fiscal year. Cash-adjusted assets is computed by adding the 
market capitalization to the book value of assets, deducting the book value of equity and the cash and 
cash equivalents amount. Model (I) estimates the Equation (2), with ROE as the dependent variable. 
Model (II) estimates Equation (2) for ROA. The regressors are defined as the following. PE_Post is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for PE-backed IPOs and 0 otherwise. IN2D represents the average 
value of change of the dependent variable (ROE and ROA) in the two-digit SIC code industry average, 
during the year of IPO and three years later. DE is the change in the leverage ratio, defined through 
dividing Net Assets market value (assets deducted from market capitalization) by the market 
capitalization at the end of the fiscal period. LA is a proxy of the changes in the logarithmic function of 
the total market value of assets' proxy (cash-adjusted assets plus cash and cash equivalents). Variables 
Year are clustering variables, representing the average difference, in the long-term, of our dependent 
variables. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis under the respective coefficient and are 
transformed in robust standard errors, correcting for homoskedasticity. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  Dependent Variable: 
  ROE ROA 
















































Observations 426 426 
R2 0.260 0.259 
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.245 




Figure 5: Comparison between the values obtained in regression and real values (ROE) 
The figure below presents the regression obtained in Table 4, for Model (I). The dashed line presents 
the regression line. In the x labels, the actual values for the difference between ROE three years after the 
IPO and ROE at the IPO year-end. ROE is calculated by dividing the net income by the market 
capitalization, at the end of the fiscal year. In the y labels, we find the value for the difference between 
both periods, predicted by the model. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison between the values obtained in regression and real values(ROA) 
The figure below presents the regression obtained in Table 4, for Model (II). The dashed line presents 
the regression line. In the x labels, the actual values for the difference between ROA three years after the 
IPO and ROA at the IPO year-end. ROA is calculated by dividing the operating income by the market 
value approximation of cash-adjusted assets, at the end of the fiscal year. Cash-adjusted assets is 
computed by adding the market capitalization to the book value of assets, deducting the book value of 
equity and the cash and cash equivalents amount. In the y labels, we find the value for the difference 








































































4.2. Interpreting the regression models’ coefficients: 
An overlook of the two regression models performed led us to assume that both performance 
indicators are impacted in the same way by the variables selected as independent. In fact, all 
the variables have the same sign of the coefficients, meaning an increase in the independent 
variable leads to an increase, if the coefficient is positive, or a decrease otherwise in the 
performance indicator. 
By comparing ROE and ROA as dependent variables, we can assume a positive correlation 
between them, as they are influenced in the same direction by each variable in the model. To 
validate this assumption, we computed the correlation between both variables, reaching a value 
of 0.857. Since this measure scales from -1 to 1, we confirm the stated hypothesis, ROE and 
ROA have a strong correlation.  
From this point onwards, our analysis will be focused only on the model (I) because studying 
both regressions would result in redundant conclusions, for the reasons stated above. 
4.2.1. Study variable: 
The only difference between our treatment and control groups is defined by our study variable 
PE_Post. The variable distinguishes the long-term performance between PE-backed IPOs and 
others, holding everything else constant. 
Being its coefficient significant within a 99% confidence interval, we may conclude on the 
existence of a PE effect on the long-term performance of IPOs. The surprising effect we did not 
expect was its negative impact. We were expecting a positive effect of treatment in our sample, 
as it was the situation found in the Brazilian market (Sincerre, Sampaio, Famá, & Flores, 2019). 
Another subject these findings contest is the underpricing comparison, leading us to question 
the investors’ trust in these firms (Lee & Wahal, 2004). 
Interpreting the coefficient of the variable PE_Post, we observe a negative influence of PE on 
the long-term performance of firms, after leaving their ownership. The effect, on average, leads 
to treated firms obtaining a growth, in absolute measures, of ROE, in three years after the IPO, 
lower in 7.8% than the control group.  
In the following sections, we will identify the main sources of these results, by analysing in-




4.2.2. Control variables: 
4.2.2.1. Industrial sectors: 
The first control variable, from our regression, that was analysed, referred to industrial, two-
digit SIC code defined, abnormal performance, IN2D. As the model is centred around its mean, 
it does not come as a surprise that a variable centred on the average of a sub-group does not 
have significance for our regression. However, we were still concerned that some industries 
perform differently than others. 
Figure 7: Difference in ROE across sectors 
The figure below presents the difference in performance indicator ROE between the year of IPO and 
three years later by treatment and control groups, represented in the two lines. ROE is calculated by 
dividing the net income by the market capitalization, at the end of the fiscal year. In the x labels, we may 
find the name of the industrial sector, ordered by weight in the sample. In the y labels, we find the values 
for the difference in ROE.  
 
Figure 7 presents the performance of both treatment and control groups across sectors. From 
this chart, we can conclude that, when firms are PE-backed, they are generally inferior 
performing than the others. In fact, the ten largest sectors from our sample count for 78% of all 
observations. From these sectors, PE-backed IPOs are better performing in only two.  
In these two sectors, Healthcare Services and Technology Equipment, we find 25 Private-
Equity backed IPOs and 16 other firms, summing 9.6% of our sample.  These sectors are not 
representative of the whole market, but its results must be carefully considered, as we may be 
witnessing strength in previously PE financed IPOs in these segments. 
When performing a t-test on the difference in means between both samples, we reject the null 
hypothesis of the existence of different values for the mean between PE-backed IPOs and 
others. The p-value was 0.512, leading us reject the null hypothesis of PE-backed firms having 












Changes in leverage (control variable DE) influence negatively the behaviour of ROE in our 
sample. The regression led us to assume that, when a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio increases by 
one unit, its expected net income will register a value of 3.5%, as a percentage of shareholders’ 
equity, lower.  
The variable controls for changes in the capital structure of the firms. A second analysis was 
required to understand if PE-backed IPOs behave differently than others when analysed the 
leverage ratio at the year-end of the IPO. 
Figure 8: Difference in ROE by the leverage ratio 
The figure below presents the difference in performance indicator ROE between the year of IPO and 
three years later by treatment and control groups, represented in the two lines. ROE is calculated by 
dividing the net income by the market capitalization, at the end of the fiscal year. In the x labels, we may 
find ten intervals, each containing 10% of total observations of variable DE at the IPO year. In the y 
labels, we find the values for the difference in ROE. 
 
The figure above demonstrates that the performance of treated observations is generally inferior 
to the one of the control group of observations. These conclusions are in line with our regression 
model. 
4.2.2.3. The logarithmic function of assets’ market value: 
The variable LA represents changes in the company’s size. The positive coefficient states that, 
when the size of assets increase by 1%, the ROE is expected to grow by ln(1+1%)*0.127, which 
is approximately 0.127%. 
The model analyses only the changes in total assets, it does not compare the treatment effect 
among observations with different sizes at the IPO date. To consider this constraint of our 
model, we present, below, a graphical representation of the long-term performance by the size 
of the observations at the IPO year-end. 
From Figure 9 we conclude that long-term performance has a more accentuated disparity 
between PE-backed IPOs and others when firms are smaller. In fact, 44% of our observations 
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have a value for LA at the IPO year-end higher than 14. This fact led us to suspect of abnormal 
performance effects only for smaller firms. 
Figure 9: Difference in ROE by assets’ size 
The figure below presents the difference in performance indicator ROE between the year of IPO and 
three years later by treatment and control groups, represented in the two lines. ROE is calculated by 
dividing the net income by the market capitalization, at the end of the fiscal year. In the x labels, we may 
find the value of LA. In the y labels, we find the values for the difference in ROE.  
 
 
We performed a t-test to the hypothesis of the true difference of means, between control and 
treated groups, when LA was higher than 14, and conclusions were as follow. With a p-value 
of 0.210, we rejected the null hypothesis. Having this considered, we decided to create two 
classes of observations, by their size at IPO year-end: small firms and large firms. Later, we 
submitted each class to our regression model, defined in Equation (2). 
By this second regression, in Table 5, we see that the effect of our variable of study is much 
more accentuated for smaller firms and that there is no statistical significance for the coefficient 
of the variable PE_Post in larger firms. 
4.2.2.4. Cluster variables (Year): 
The use of control variables for the year when IPO was issued allowed us to correct our 
regression model for economic cycles in the market. 
The interpretation of these coefficients states that, holding everything else constant, the average 
expected difference between ROE in the two periods of study is equal to the beta associated 
with the year of issue. 
The only year cluster coefficient that has significance in our model is the year 2012. Its 
significance means IPOs issued during this year had a significantly different performance from 
the rest of the sample. In order to understand if different performances in this year would affect 
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Table 5: Regression models by the class of firm size 
This table presents the impact of PE-backed IPOs, in comparison to others, on performance measured 
by ROE. ROE is defined by net income on market capitalisation. Model (I) estimates the Equation (2), 
with ROE as the dependent variable, for observations categorised as “Small Firms”. Model (II) estimates 
Equation (2), with ROE as the dependent variable, for observations categorised as “Large Firms”. The 
regressors are defined as the following. PE_Post is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for PE-
backed IPOs and 0 otherwise. IN2D represents the average value of change of the dependent variable 
ROE in the two-digit SIC code industry average, between the year of IPO and three years later. DE is 
the change in the leverage ratio, defined through dividing Net Assets market value (assets deducted from 
market capitalization) by the market capitalization at the end of the fiscal period. LA is a proxy of the 
changes in the logarithmic function of the total market value of assets’ proxy (book value of assets plus 
market capitalization at the end of the fiscal period, deducted from the market value of equity). Variables 
Year are clustering variables, representing the average difference, in the long-term, of our dependent 
variables. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis under the respective coefficient and are 
transformed in robust standard errors, correcting for homoskedasticity. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: 
 ROE 














































Observations 239 187 
     of which PE 109 71 
     of which Others 130 116 
R2 0.342 0.158 
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.120 




Table 6: Regression models by issue date of IPO 
This table presents the impact of PE-backed IPOs, in comparison to others, on performance measured 
by ROE. ROE is defined by net income on market capitalisation. Model (I) estimates the Equation (2), 
without year clusters, with ROE as the dependent variable, for observations issued in a year different 
from 2012. Model (II) estimates the Equation (2), without year clusters, with ROE as the dependent 
variable, for observations issued in the year 2012. The regressors are defined as the following. PE_Post 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for PE-backed IPOs and 0 otherwise. IN2D represents the 
average value of change of the dependent variable ROE in the two-digit SIC code industry average, 
between the year of IPO and three years later. DE is the change in the leverage ratio, defined through 
dividing Net Assets market value (assets deducted from market capitalization) by the market 
capitalization at the end of the fiscal period. LA is a proxy of the changes in the logarithmic function of 
the total market value of assets’ proxy (book value of assets plus market capitalization at the end of the 
fiscal period, deducted from the market value of equity). Standard errors are presented in parenthesis 
under the respective coefficient and are transformed in robust standard errors, correcting for 
homoskedasticity. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: 
 ROE 





















Observations 357 69 
     of which PE 149 31 
     of which Others 208 38 
R2 0.222 0.404 
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.376 
Note: *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
Analysing the table above lets us be assured that, even though the firms have different 
performance in the year 2012, it does not change the results obtained with our model. In fact, 
there is still a similar PE influence present in both groups. 
4.2.3. Other factors not captured by the model: 
When analysing our sample, we identified two other factors not captured by the model: the 
firms’ age and the percentage of shares issued at the IPO. As we applied a first differences 
model, we can only make regressions considering the factors that change between the two times 




different characteristics. As we were able to measure these two factors, we considered them as 
added value for our understanding of PE effect. 
4.2.3.1. Firm’s age: 
The age of firms is an important characteristic to bear into consideration (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986). To analyse the impact of age on performance, we extracted from Jay Ritter’s website 
data for the foundation year of each company. Later, we calculated the age at IPO date, resulting 
in variable Age. 
Figure 10: Difference in ROE by age at IPO 
The figure below presents the difference in performance indicator ROE between the year of IPO and 
three years later by treatment and control groups, represented in the two lines. ROE is calculated by 
dividing the net income by the market capitalization, at the end of the fiscal year. In the x labels, we may 
find ten intervals, each containing 10% of total observations on variable Age at the IPO year. In the y 
labels, we find the values for the difference in ROE. 
 
From the figure above we conclude that it is possible that there is no PE effect on firms aged 
under 6 years. In order to testify this hypothesis, we performed a t-test on the difference in 
means between the two groups. For the test, we used 150 observations, 45 of which were PE-
backed IPOs. The p-value was 0.036, meaning we do not reject the null hypothesis of young 
firms from the treatment group having worse long-term performance than young firms from the 
control group, with a 95% confidence level. 
All in all, this analysis concluded there is no difference in treatment effect between control and 
treatment groups. Our regression’s results are not affected by the age of firms at IPO. 
4.2.3.2. Percentage of shares issued at IPO: 
Equity retention has a positive correlation with performance (Jain & Kini, 1994). A study of 
the comparison between treatment and control groups, based on the percentage of outstanding 
shares issued at the IPO, will allow us to verify if it has an impact on the treatment effect. 
Moreover, it will provide us with the capacity to understand if we can divide our sample into 
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Figure 11: Difference in ROE by the leverage ratio 
The figure below presents the difference in performance indicator ROE between the year of IPO and 
three years later by treatment and control groups, represented in the two lines. ROE is calculated by 
dividing the net income by the market capitalization, at the end of the fiscal year. In the x labels, we may 
find the percentage of outstanding shares issued at the IPO, calculated by dividing the number of shares 
issued by the total number of outstanding shares on the IPO date. In the y labels, we find the values for 
the difference in ROE.  
 
From the figure above we suspected on a different influence of treatment in the long-term 
performance. In fact, the chart indicates that, when equity retention is below 50%, both groups 
tend to perform more similarly in the long-term.  
We performed a t-test to the hypothesis of the true difference of means, between control and 
treated groups, when the percentage issued was higher than 50%, and conclusions were as 
follow. With a p-value of 0.153, we reject the null hypothesis. Having this considered, we 
decided to adopt the same methodology used to investigate firms’ size and created two classes 
of observations, by equity retention at IPO. Later, we submitted each class to our regression 
model, defined in Equation (2). 
From this model, in Table 7, we concluded that PE-backed IPOs’ performance is also influenced 
by the percentage of shares issued. However, the variable PE_Post‘s impact was similar in 
observations with the proportion of issued shares at IPO lower than 50% as in the first model, 
in Table 4. This created a suspicion on a possible correlation between equity retention and PE 
backing. When confirming for this relationship, we identified a correlation of -0.224.  In fact, 
these results are aligned with Jain and Kini’s (1994). When firms are PE-backed, they perform 
worse than others but, these effects are offset by an overperformance registered for firms with 
higher levels of equity retention. When the percentage of shares issued is higher, the impact of 
PE_Post is neglected for two reasons. First, there is a negative impact due to the lower levels 
of equity retention. Second, there is a positive impact due to fewer observations of PE-backed 
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Table 7: Regression models by the class of firm size 
This table presents the impact of PE-backed IPOs, in comparison to others, on performance measured 
by ROE. ROE is defined by net income on market capitalisation. Model (I) estimates the Equation (2), 
with ROE as the dependent variable, for observations with the proportion of issued shares at IPO lower 
than 50%. Model (II) estimates Equation (2), with ROE as the dependent variable, for observations with 
the proportion of issued shares at IPO higher than 50%. The regressors are defined as the following. 
PE_Post is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for PE-backed IPOs and 0 otherwise. IN2D 
represents the average value of change of the dependent variable ROE in the two-digit SIC code industry 
average, between the year of IPO and three years later. DE is the change in the leverage ratio, defined 
through dividing Net Assets market value (assets deducted from market capitalization) by the market 
capitalization at the end of the fiscal period. LA is a proxy of the changes in the logarithmic function of 
the total market value of assets’ proxy (book value of assets plus market capitalization at the end of the 
fiscal period, deducted from the market value of equity). Variables Year are clustering variables, 
representing the average difference, in the long-term, of our dependent variables. Standard errors are 
presented in parenthesis under the respective coefficient and are transformed in robust standard errors, 
correcting for homoskedasticity. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: 
 ROE 














































Observations 290 136 
     of which PE 147 33 
     of which Others 143 103 
R2 0.328 0.233 
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.184 




4.3. Findings’ discussion: 
In section 4.1. we identified that our treatment group underperformed the control group on both 
static periods of study. However, as said before, to compare long-term performance we needed 
more than just identifying two periods. It was required to investigate how each group changed 
from one situation to another, thus applying the regression model defined in equation (2). 
The first conclusion drawn from the two first models performed was the positive correlation 
between the two dependent variables chosen. In fact, positive correlation states that the more 
effectively the firms’ resources are managed to create profits (ROE), the better performing are 
its assets to generate operating income (ROA). Both indicators allow the investigator to study 
operating performance, meaning that, by selecting only one, would result in the same 
conclusions. 
The second conclusion identified in the model overview was the negative, statistically 
significant, the impact created by the coefficient on the variable PE_Post. This led us to provide 
some credence to critics of PE. As a matter of fact, measures adopted by these funds may still 
damage the long-term performance of firms. There is however another possible reason that 
should not be excluded: investors believe in PE-backed IPOs (Lee & Wahal, 2004). 
To investigate if this second justification is aligned with our sample, we performed a t-test to 
the null hypothesis of having different means of underpricing between treatment and control 
groups. In fact, with a p-value of 0.0002, we do not reject the null hypothesis. All in all, there 
is a possibility of PE not being destroying long-term performance, but leading investors to 
overvalue the firms backed by these funds instead.  
We also investigated different factors that could affect performance, concluding that, from our 
selected control variables, both groups behaved differently under different values for LA. As a 
matter of fact, when firms are smaller, there is a higher risk of achieving abnormal high or low 
performance levels. The PE type of funds that focus on growing smaller firms is VC. There 
might be a different effect of treatment in the long-term performance if all the PE’s types are 
analysed separately. Leveraged Buyouts, for example, might have a different impact, as these 
funds invest in usually larger firms (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). Although, we could not achieve 
a statistically significant effect on PE_Post for large firms. 
The last conclusion we were able to draw was extracted through an analysis of a variable that 
our regression model could not capture. The larger the portion of shareholders’ equity issued at 




effect also behaves differently for firms that issue more than 50% of their shares at IPO and the 
ones that issue less.  The latter group is where VC are concentrated, aligning this effect with 
the conclusions described in the previous paragraph. However, we must bear into consideration 
that the observations from the former group are only 33 for PE-backed IPOs, which can be 
another reason for not finding a statistically significant effect on PE_Post for these 
observations.  
4.4. Limitations: 
When analysing the findings of our study, one must be aware of its limitations. The conclusions 
obtained by this investigation are subject to some constraints and further research might provide 
corrections to them. The main restraints are as follows. 
First of all, IPO represents only the third most used exit strategy by LBO funds (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2009). As such, our data is more centred on VC-backed observations, the reason for 
the control group being more concentrated on smaller firms with lower levels of equity 
proportion issued at IPO. Further investigation on this topic would require comparing the 
impacts on long-term performance by each type of PE. 
One second constraint is the use of market values, that are subject to being overvalued or 
undervalued by investors. To improve our conclusions, it is needed to understand whether the 
negative impact on ROE is created by lower levels of returns or higher values of market 
capitalisation. This would require a deeper investigation of each firm within our sample. 
The third limitation identified is the human error, as all our observations were checked 
individually for the previous relationship with PE funds, available in Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
Even though our data was carefully treated, one must be aware of this possibility. 
Lastly, the sample lacks observations to draw substantiated conclusions on some effects, like 
the sectorial breakdown, which could identify different impacts on some sectors, particularly in 
Healthcare Services and on Technology Equipment. Even though it did not have a significant 
impact, we must consider also the possibility of a different effect of PE financing in these two 






In this study, we investigated what happened to firms after the exit of PE funds through an IPO. 
By focusing on the targets’ performance, we seeked to understand, whether supporters of this 
financing method were right, or if the performance in the price of shares of PE backed 
companies  in the three years following their IPO, is negatively impacted by the incumbrances 
of having been in a PE fund’s portfolio. 
We used a sample of 426 IPOs, 180 of which were PE-backed, from two stock exchanges – 
NYSE and NASDAQ. We analysed what differed between treatment and control groups in 
terms of their long-term performance, defined by the three years following the date of listing. 
We identified that firms with a previous history of PE relationships underperformed the others, 
in terms of long-term operating performance. 
The regression model selected for this thesis was the first differences, as it allowed us to 
consider variables that did not remain constant throughout the timeline under scrutiny. To 
evaluate the robustness of our results, we considered different firm-specific characteristics in 
the IPO year. We evaluated the performance of the Industrial Sectors in which our observations 
belonged, the size, the leverage ratio, the year of issue, the age and the percentage of equity 
issued. From these characteristics, we discovered that the treatment effect was not constant 
when the size and the issued percentage, from shareholders’ equity, were considered. In fact, 
PE-backed firms are expected to perform poorly, when compared to other firms, especially if 
the firms are small. For larger firms, we could not achieve a statistically significant result. In 
what concerns the percentage of shares issued, PE financing only impacts on firms that issued 
lower percentages of outstanding shares. However, we must consider the possibility of 
overvaluation of the market capitalization in PE-backed IPOs, as these observations present 
higher values for underpricing. 
All in all, our conclusions raise important managerial questions. Based on our results, managers 
should be aware of the long-term performance in the value of their companies when financing 
through PE. Even though PE funds often provide an opportunity for exponential growth, the 
negative impact, after funds’ exit their investments on the long-term performance, is a cost that 
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